COMMAND
trn
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Debian
PROBLEM
Richard Kettlewell has reported a security problem with trn. Trn
comes with a newsgroups shell script that uses a hardcoded
filename in /tmp as temporary storage. As you all know, this
could be exploited to overwrite arbitrary files. If the file
already exists as symbolic link to users files they will be
overwritten. This was not intentional by the author, he tried to
use tempfile(1) to create the temporary filename. However, due
to a thinko, the name was hardcoded into the script.
SOLUTION
Debian GNU/Linux 2.1 alias slink
--------------------------------
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1.diff.gz
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1.dsc
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1_alpha.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1_i386.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1_m68k.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/proposed-updates/trn_3.6-9.3.1_sparc.deb
Debian GNU/Linux unstable alias potato
--------------------------------------
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/source/news/trn_3.6-9.4.diff.gz
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/source/news/trn_3.6-9.4.dsc
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/source/news/trn_3.6.orig.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/binary-alpha/news/trn_3.6-9.4.deb
http://security.debian.org/dists/unstable/updates/binary-arm/trn_3.6-9.4_arm.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/binary-i386/news/trn_3.6-9.4.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/binary-m68k/news/trn_3.6-9.4.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/binary-powerpc/news/trn_3.6-9.4.deb
ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/dists/unstable/main/binary-sparc/news/trn_3.6-9.4.deb
Patch against version 3.6.
diff -u -Nur --exclude CVS orig/trn-3.6/newsgroups.SH trn-3.6/newsgroups.SH
--- orig/trn-3.6/newsgroups.SH Thu Aug 19 12:05:40 1999
+++ trn-3.6/newsgroups.SH Thu Aug 19 12:04:59 1999
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#NORMAL~*) active=\`$filexp \$active\` ;;
#NORMALesac
#NNTP
-#NNTPactive=`tempfile -p active` #"/tmp/active.\$\$"
+#NNTPactive=\`tempfile -p active\` #"/tmp/active.\$\$"
#NNTPrnlib=$privlib
#NNTPcase \$rnlib in
#NNTP~*) rnlib=\`$filexp \$rnlib\` ;;
This patch got nothing to do with above one for Debian as it uses
tempfile? This usually yields an easily predictable filename, for
which the same exploits hold. Just keep an eye out for the last
PID issued, and OK, this time you might need to flip a link
(provided that tempfile indeed refuses to return a file that is
currently symlinked.)