COMMAND

    backdoor

SYSTEMS AFFECTED

    Some vendors on Win98 (others?)

PROBLEM

    Richard M. Smith posted following.   He's talking about the  scope
    of a security problem that  he found in a Compaq  Presario Windows
    98  system.   It  seems  that  this  system  was configured at the
    factory  with  a  backdoor  in  Internet  Explorer.  This backdoor
    allows  programs  from  a  Compaq  Web  site to be executed on the
    computer with no security warnings.   What he's wondering here  is
    how widespread  of practice  it is  for Compaq  and other computer
    maufacturers to  turn this  type of  backdoor on  their PCs.  Here
    are the steps to determine if the backdoor is on:

        1. Start Internet Explorer 4 or 5
        2. Select the "View | Internet Options..." menu command in IE4
           or the "Tools | Internet Options..." menu command in IE5
        3. Select the "Content"  tab in the "Internet  Options" dialog
           box
        4. Push the "Publishers..." button

    If  "Compaq  Computer  Corporation"  (or  the  name of the company
    who made your computer)  is  now listed as a trusted publisher  in
    the  "Authenticode  Security  Technology"  dialog  box,  then  the
    backdoor is on.

    Richard believes that  this backdoor is  turned on in  most Compaq
    models that  run Windows  98.   Assumption is  that this  Internet
    Explorer feature was designed to be used only by system admins and
    users and not computer makers.

    Why was this backdoor  turned on in the  first place?  Seems  kind
    of strange that  a computer company  wants to be  able to remotely
    run programs  on their  customer's computers.   It looks  like the
    backdoor is intended to be used in some specialize utilities  that
    Compaq ships  as part  of Windows  98.   These utilities reside on
    the  local  hard  drive.   Security  checking  is  turned  off for
    programs created  by Compaq  so that  these utilities  can be  run
    without getting annoying  security warnings in  Internet Explorer.
    As  a  side-effect  of  this  decision,  Compaq  can  also execute
    programs from pages from their  Web sites or even from  HTML Email
    messages.

    However, there exists a much more serious hole on this same Compaq
    system which allows  anyone to go  through this same  backdoor and
    run programs on the system.  This second security hole means  that
    a malicious program can be  used to drop a computer  virus, delete
    data from the disk, or  steal private files.  This  second problem
    was first  found late  last year  by another  person, but for some
    reason never  fixed by  Compaq.  His name is Frank Farance and the
    site with more info is:

        http://www.farance.com/etc/ie40-security-bug-19981120/index.html

    Experiment #1: Can  Windows commands be  executed from a  browser?
    Frank was concerned  that significant, potentially  abusive system
    access  was  permitted  through   the  browser.   With  a   little
    experimentation  (but  not  actually  wiping  the  disk  yet),  he
    discovered  that  it  is  possible  to  access  Windows   commands
    directly via the browser.  He inspected the HTML files (see  below
    for a copy of the files) and discovered Windows commands  embedded
    in the HTML.  Apparently, the HTML calls Javascript which  invokes
    a  Java  applet  which  then  can  run  any  program  on the local
    computer.

    Experiment #2:  Does this  work on  other browsers?   Frank  tried
    this  in  Netscape  Communicator  4.5  on  the  same laptop, which
    balked.  He wes  unable to recreate the  problem in Netscape.   He
    added the ActiveX plug-in by NCompass to Netscape, but still  were
    unable to recreate the problem in Netscape.

    Experiment #3: Does this problem exist on Windows 95?  Frank tried
    creating the problem on Windows 95, but was unable to.  IMPORTANT:
    This problem may exist on Windows 95, Frank was unable to recreate
    the problem with limited experimentation.

    Experiment #4: Will this work across the web?  Frank thought  this
    problem might exist only because the files were local.  Not  true.
    He uploaded  the files  onto a  web sever,  loaded the remote URL,
    and caused his laptop to execute commands.

    Experiment #5: Can  any command be  executed over the  web?  Frank
    modified  the  HTML  and  Javascript  and  were able to choose any
    program to run.   The applet was "signed"  by Verisign.  It's  not
    clear yet how  the signed applet  is related to  additional and/or
    insecure access  to the  system.   IMPORTANT: This  means that any
    command  can  be  silently  run  on  a user's computer, including:
    formatting  the  disk  drive  (verified),  rebooting your computer
    (verified),  silent  upload/download  (simulated)  of  any  of the
    user's files.

    Experiment #6:  Can comands  be run  with parameters?   Frank also
    verified that commands can be run with parameters -- an  important
    feature because it allows, potentially, more destructive  behavior
    with  less  setup.   IMPORTANT:  In  effect,  this security hazard
    doesn't require the user to download viruses onto the computer  --
    the viruses (normal windows commands) are already there.

    Frank reached the limits  of experimentation techniques.   Further
    experimentation  would  require  significantly  more effort and is
    better  performed  by  the  Compaq  (laptop  manufacturer)  and/or
    Microsoft  (browser  vendor  and  operating  system  vendor).   He
    copied all the files into the following directory:

        http://www.farance.com/etc/ie40-security-bug-19981120/sample-files

    The file "fwqrcd.html" is the original file where the problem  was
    discovered.  The  files "testjunk.html" and  "testjunk1.html" show
    calling a  command and  a command  with a  parameter. We've chosen
    harmless commands in "testjunk*".

    This backdoor, in combination with a Compaq-supplied Java  applet,
    has  introduced  a  serious  security  hole in Internet Explorer 4
    which allows outsiders  to execute DOS  and Windows programs  from
    Web pages or  HTML Email messages.   Once an outsider  is able  to
    run a program  on a system,  all the usual  bad stuff can  be done
    such as  install a  virus or  trojan horse,  delete files from the
    hard disk, steal  private information, etc.   The backdoor  occurs
    because IE4  is configured  on this  Presario system  to trust all
    ActiveX controls and  Java applets signed  by Compaq.   It appears
    that for my system,  Compaq was added as  a trusted source at  the
    factory.   This  wouldn't  be  so  bad  by itself, except that the
    Presario system  also includes  a signed  Java applet  that has  a
    function for running  programs.  Because  the applet is  signed by
    Compaq, it will  execute with no  security warnings in  IE4 on any
    system where Compaq is a trusted publisher.

    This applet is used on a Compaq HTML page to link to various
    service options for customers.  Some these links go to Compaq Web
    sites, but other links run diagnostic programs from the local
    hard drive.  The Java applet is used to run these programs.  Since
    it is a signed applet, it is able to do things outside of the Java
    sandbox such as execute programs.  The applet appears to have no
    security mechanisms built into itself so it can run any program,
    not just the Compaq diagnostic programs.

    The method that Compaq uses to make itself a trusted publisher  in
    IE4 is quite interesting.  On the Windows desktop there is an icon
    labeled "Compaq Support".  Clicking on this icon takes you to  the
    HTML  page  described  above.   However  it  gets  there by a very
    curious route.  The icon doesn't start up IE4 directly but instead
    runs a DOS  batch file of  all things.   The first thing  that the
    batch does  is to  feed a  .REG file  to REGEDIT.   This .REG file
    contains  the  appropriate  settings  to  make  Compaq  a  trusted
    publisher in  IE4.   Yikes, lowering  security settings  in IE  is
    just too  darn easy!   Once the  registry has  been  appropriately
    tweaked, IE4 is started up with the services links page.


SOLUTION

    Compaq is looking into various ways to patch the problem.  In  the
    meantime, a simple solution to  the problem is to delete  from the
    hard disk  the .REG  file that  makes Compaq  a trusted publisher.
    The path of the file to be deleted is:

        C:\CPQS\SERVICE\CERTREG.REG

    You'll also want to remove Compaq as a trusted publisher from  IE.
    Here are the steps:

        1. Start Internet Explorer 4 or 5
        2. Select the "View | Internet Options..." menu command in IE4
           or "Tools | Internet Options..." in IE5
        3. Select the "Content"  tab in the "Internet  Options" dialog
           box
        4. Push the "Publishers..." button
        5. Click on the "Compaq Computer Corporation" entry if present
        6. Push the "Remove" button.
        7. Push  the  "Okay"  button  for  the "Authenticode  Security
           Technology" dialog box.
        8. Push the  "Okay" button for  the "Internet Options"  dialog
           box.

    You'll  need  to  remove  Compaq  as  the  trusted publisher after
    deleting the .REG file.  Otherwise, clicking on the icon will make
    Compaq be trusted again.